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35 Individualism 
John B. Davis 
The term 'individualism' has functioned as one of the main organizing principles of eco-
nomics for over a century. Yet despite this, considerable ambiguity still surrounds the 
discipline's use of the term. In particular, there is a lack of clarity on (i) its methodologi-
cal interpretation and ultimate value as an organizing principle, (ii) the conception of the 
individual that is appropriate to reasoning in economics and (iii) the normative implica-
tions of the standard view of individuals in economics. These three issues are addressed 
in this chapter. 
Competing views of individualism 
Individualism in economics - often termed 'methodological individualism' - is the 
view that individuals should figure centrally in all economics-related explanations. In 
contrast, holism - or 'methodological holism' - is the view that social groups and other 
social aggregates should figure centrally in such explanations. Schumpeter coined the 
former term a century ago (Schumpeter 1908; and compare 1909), later defining it as an 
explanation that focused on the 'behavior of individuals without going into the factors 
that formed this behavior' (Schumpeter 1954, p. 889). He distinguished this from 'socio-
logical individualism', the - in his view 'untenable' - idea that 'all social phenomena 
resolve themselves into decisions and actions of individuals that need not or cannot be 
further analyzed in terms of supraindividual factors ' (ibid. , p. 888). This last is what 
many economists and other social scientists today regard as the meaning of methodo-
logical individualism. For example, Elster defines methodological individualism as 'the 
doctrine that all social phenomena (their structure and their change) are in principle 
explicable only in terms of individuals - their properties, goals, and beliefs' (Elster 1982, 
p. 453). Schumpeter simply recommends that we take individual behaviour at face value, 
whereas Elster and others assert that all economic explanations are necessarily rooted in 
individual behaviour. 
In this latter formulation, methodological individualism is sometimes associated with a 
strong form of ontological individualism. While general ontological individualism is the 
view that individuals are amongst the kinds of things that exist in the world, the strong 
form of this doctrine states that only individuals exist. Hayek (1955) was a leading pro-
ponent of this strong form of ontological individualism, arguing that supra-individual 
entities are not real things of the order of individuals but only concepts, where concepts 
are features of individuals. According to this view, methodological individualism implies 
a reductionist programme of explanation (compare Kincaid 1997). Following Elster's 
language above, this would seek to reduce all explanations framed in terms of social 
entities - such as institutions, classes and social groups, norms and conventions - to 
explanations framed in terms of individuals. 
Much of contemporary rational choice theory operates on this programme, seeking to 
expl<1:in social institutions and other durable social arrangements as solely the outcome 
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of the choices individuals make. Examples include the new institutional economics and 
classical game theory. The export of economic reasoning to other social sciences - known 
as 'economic imperialism' - is generally associated with the application of an individualist 
rational choice explanation to phenomena customarily believed to be inescapably social 
in nature in such fields as political science, sociology and law. 
Agassi (1975), following Popper (1945), rejected this reductionist view. He argued that 
the correct form of individualism for economics and social science is what he termed 
'institutional individualism'. If we suppose institutions and other supra-individual enti-
ties exist along with individuals, then we effectively combine individualism with holism by 
supposing neither can be reduced to the other (compare Boland 2003, Ch. 2). However, 
while this makes sense in principle, abandoning reductionism raises a new set of issues 
associated with explaining how individuals and institutions affect one another. Individual 
action is both influenced by its institutional environment, and also influences that insti-
tutional environment; similarly, institutions are the product of individual actions, and 
also condition individual actions. But if this is so, then why should we be speaking about 
any kind of individualism at all (Hodgson 2007)? Or, to turn this question around, why 
is the economics of Veblen, Commons and Ayers called 'institutionalism', since they 
also understood individuals and institutions to be mutually influencing? These ques-
tions suggest that focusing on methodological stances such as individualism and holism 
(institutionalism) may not be very helpful, and that if we are to better understand the 
significance of the individual in economics, we should begin by attending more closely to 
the conceptions of the individual used in economics. 
Competing conceptions of the individual 
Methodological individualism in the strong form identified above is associated with 
a particular conception of the nature of the individual. Since this conception strongly 
contrasts individuals with social institutions, individuals must by nature be non-social 
or socially isolated, atomistic beings. Thus, they can be defined only in terms of their 
own personal characteristics, which excludes any reference to individuals' social char-
acteristics and social relationships. This particular conception originated in neoclassical 
economics in the late nineteenth century with the marginal utility theory. That theory 
described individuals subjectively in terms of their private psychological states. Later, 
the preference theory of neoclassical economics eliminated the concept of utility from 
the theory of choice, and post-war economics largely abandoned the earlier psychologi-
cal interpretation of the individual. However, the individual remains an atomistic being 
in that individuals are still viewed strictly in terms of their own personal characteristics. 
Choices are explained simply in terms of the idea of individuals having their own sepa-
rate objective functions, often still called 'utility functions', though without the original 
meaning of the term. Further, nothing is said regarding what factors, social or otherwise, 
might influence these objective functions. 
Thus, individualism in this strong form simply reduces the individual to its most 
abstract conception possible. While this may be well suited to formal analysis in math-
ematical models, it tells us little about the behaviour of individuals in particular historical 
social settings. Indeed, there is nothing in this highly abstract conception of the individual 
that identifies what kind of individual is involved, since there is nothing in the idea of 
an objective function that prevents this formal tool from being applied to single human 
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beings, groups of human beings (think of firms and countries), animals or even machines 
such as computerized stock trading programs. All can be understood as 'individuals'. 
Alternatively, allowing that individuals have social characteristics as well as personal 
ones gives us a non-atomistic conception of the individual which may be termed the con-
ception of the individual as 'socially embedded' (Davis 2003). Individuals who occupy 
locations in networks of social relationships are members of social groups and are influ-
enced by social institutions. They are still individual by virtue of the distinct location they 
occupy in these social phenomena, but they also have social characteristics by virtue of 
their various relations to others. In this non-reductionist understanding, supra-individual 
entities also exist. Social networks, social groups, institutions and patterns of social rela-
tionships are all real entities alongside individuals. The challenge of this broader view, 
then, is to explain how individuals can be motivated by a combination of personal and 
social factors. 
Sen offers one such account in his argument that commitment behaviour is funda-
mentally different from behaviour motivated by self-interest (Sen 1977). Commitment 
cannot be understood in terms of self-interest, since it is essentially other-oriented. At 
the same time, commitments to others are personal when they are made by one person 
to another (or to a number of others). Commitments, then, are made by individuals who 
are embedded in social relationships structured by commitments. Another example is 
the phenomenon of collective intentions or individual intentions expressed using the 
first-person plural 'we' language. When people make statements preceded by 'we', they 
bind themselves to others who fall within the scope of their use of the 'we' term. Their 
statement is thus essentially other-oriented. At the same time, expressing an intention is 
something one does individually. Consequently, individuals are socially embedded when 
using 'we' language, just as when they make commitments to others. A third example is 
the phenomenon of trust. When individuals trust one another they put aside their view 
of each other as different and separate. They are held by a bond that encompasses them 
as individuals. But they are still individuals in that trust holds between people. Thus, 
individuals are socially embedded when trust relationships prevail. A final example is 
associated with Smith's ([1759] 1976) concept of the impartial spectator. Smith believed 
that individuals could remove themselves from their own situation to judge the well-being 
of others from a disinterested, impartial perspective. In effect, they put themselves in the 
place of others, but since they are able to do this as individuals, they embed their own 
view in social understanding. 
Individualism, therefore, need not imply either that individuals are socially isolated 
atoms or that they invariably act out of self-interest. When we substitute the conception 
of the individual as socially embedded for the conception of the individual as atomistic, 
we are still pre-eminently concerned with individuals, though individuals are then under-
stood in terms of their social characteristics as well as their personal ones. This wider 
perspective is especially important when we turn from behavioural analysis to normative 
analysis in economics, since this perspective allows us to expand the array of norma-
tive considerations that we bring to bear on the evaluation of economic outcomes and 
states of affairs. That is, when individuals are seen to have social characteristics as well 
as personal ones, normative concerns that pertain to relationships between individuals 
come directly into the picture alongside normative concerns that pertain specifically to 
individual well-being. 
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The discussion that follows charts this expansion in normative concerns by first iden-
tifying those concerns that specifically target individual well-being, and then going on to 
show how the wider perspective on the individual afforded by a conception of the indi-
vidual as socially embedded raises additional normative concerns specifically associated 
with relationships between individuals. 
Expanding the scope of normative concern 
The standard view of the individual as an atomistic being is also associated with norma-
tive evaluation by the standard of Pareto improvements. The Pareto criterion recom-
mends changes that improve at least one individual's well-being without worsening that 
of any other individual. An improvement in well-being for an isolated individual can be 
measured only in terms of the individual's personal characteristics, which is a matter of 
achieving a higher degree of 'preference' satisfaction, as understood in terms of the indi-
vidual's objective function. There is a small space in which such improvements can also 
concern the well-being of others when an individual feels sympathy for others. But such 
well-being gains for others are only a by-product and not the determinant of a Pareto 
improvement. Moreover, in the atomistic individual framework, individual advantage is 
not comparable across individuals, so one cannot compare a collection of improvements 
in well-being of others with whom an individual might sympathize with the individual's 
own resulting improvement in well-being. 
Pareto improvements, thus understood, are not a very good measure of what is 
involved in improvements of an individual's well-being. Since the individual's objective 
function represents the individual's own 'preferences' , it is possible that what an expert 
outside observer (such as a health professional) would regard as an improvement in the 
individual's well-being would not be seen as such by the individual. The isolated indi-
vidual framework, however, rules out outside observer evaluations. Therefore, this issue 
cannot arise in Pareto evaluations, despite evidence from ordinary experience that others 
do sometimes know what is to individuals' advantage better than they do themselves. 
Thus, the first normative gain available in moving to the wider perspective of the 
socially embedded conception of the individual is to allow for a broader evaluation of 
individual advantage made possible by recognizing individuals' social characteristics . 
For example, taking Sen's capability approach (Sen 1999) as providing one way of char-
acterizing individuals as socially embedded (on the grounds that individual capabilities 
are judged by social standards of attainment), individuals' social characteristics can be 
evaluated to determine well-being improvements in a manner able to go substantially 
beyond what the Pareto improvement measure tells us about individual well-being. 
Another way of looking at an expanded understanding of individual well-being con-
cerns the distinction between wants and needs. In the standard framework this distinc-
tion does not exist, because individuals' preferences are only associated with desires and 
wants. However, in many instances social institutions, which involve relatively settled 
networks of social relationships, effectively differentiate needs from wants by prioritiz-
ing some activities over others. For example, educational systems prioritize learning and 
skill acquisition over other possible uses of individuals' time, and they justify doing so 
by treating education as a need. Individuals are thus seen socially as having needs. This 
identification of a need is often reinforced by emphasis in the practices of the relevant 
institutions on the value of care. Taking care seriously as a value is equivalent to investing 
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intrinsic worth in its recipients. Thus institutions may not only redefine individual well-
being in terms of a distinction between wants and needs, but also reshape the status of 
individuals as objects of well-being concern by establishing practices organized around 
the value of care. 
What further normative concerns enter the picture, then, when we turn from seeing 
how individuals may be understood socially to individuals' own social characteristics, 
especially as reflected in the social relationships that arise between them? Here, Rawls's 
([1971] 1999) influential thinking offers an excellent point of entry. Rawls emphasizes 
justice, freedom and equality, three fundamental social values that have long been a 
major part of the history of social ethics. Accordingly, his explanation of justice rests 
upon two principles. The first principle is that individuals are entitled to as much freedom 
as is compatible with all individuals having the same freedoms. This requires an equal 
distribution of what Rawls calls 'primary goods', namely, 'rights and liberties, powers 
and opportunities, income and wealth', and also 'self-respect' (ibid., p. 62). We may 
interpret this to mean that in a just society freedom requires a fundamental equality to 
exist between individuals. In contrast, in the atomistic view of the individual, freedom 
is only about subjective choice being constrained by one's resources and endowments, 
and has nothing to do with the existence of other people. Rawls's second principle of 
justice is the 'difference' principle, which modifies the extent of equality in a society by 
allowing for inequalities in qccess to opportunities in society only when they benefit the 
least well-off. That is, in a just society inequalities are only permitted when they do not 
infringe freedoms from the point of view of those at risk. In contrast, according to the 
atomistic view of the individual, inequality is socially unconditioned in that it simply 
reflects accidental differences in individuals' resources and endowments, and therefore 
lacks any foundation in normative principles. 
Rawls 's two principles of justice, then, implicitly require us to expand our understand-
ing of the individual from the atomistic conception to a more normatively rich concep-
tion. More generally, it is fair to say that the narrowness of the atomistic conception 
significantly narrows the scope and quality of normative evaluation possible in econom-
ics, so that any serious engagement of economics with ethics depends on broadening the 
conception of the individual. 
Rawls himself understood his thinking as a kind of Kantian constructivism (Rawls 
1980, 1993). By this he meant a strategy of devising procedures for establishing legal and 
political arrangements that reasonable individuals would support given the opportunity 
for serious reflection (a 'reflective equilibrium'). While this does not tell us precisely how 
to handle cases in which apparently reasonable people disagree, it does serve to link the 
process of creating social arrangements with a particular view of individuals as being able 
to engage in civic dialogue framed by a general requirement of openness and willingness 
to revise one's thinking. Put in terms of the discussion here, individuals also have as one 
of their essential social characteristics the status of being citizens of a liberal society. They 
not only enter into social relationships with others that involve justice, freedom, and 
equality as underlying normative principles, but they also possess a special status as rea-
sonable individuals by virtue of their capacity to reflectively engage with others in deter-
mining social and political arrangements for the societies of which they are members. 
Kant himself([1785] 1959) emphasized individuals' autonomy, arguing for the intrinsic 
value and moral dignity of individuals. Rawls ties individuals' autonomy to participation 
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in society, and thus invests individuals with a value and dignity as social beings. Clearly 
the conception of the individual involved on either account is far removed from the 
narrow, socially isolated conception of the individual found in standard economics. We 
might conclude, then, by offering a final appraisal of what the concept of individual-
ism can and ought to involve in social science and economics. An adequate concept of 
individualism, it seems fair to say, needs to comprehend individuals in the full range of 
aspects they exhibit and which concern them. This surely includes their natures as social 
and moral beings. 
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